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Driver Licensing vs. Right to Travel

Author Unknown

The following argument has been used in at least three states
(Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) as a legal brief to support a
demand for dismissal of charges of "driving without a license." It
is the argument that was the reason for the charges to be dropped, or for
a "win" in court against the argument that free people can have
their right to travel regulated by their servants.

The forgotten legal maxim is that free people have a right to
travel on the roads which are provided by their servants for that purpose,
using ordinary transportation of the day. Licensing cannot be required of
free people, because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the
surrender of a right. The driver's license can be required of people who
use the highways for trade, commerce, or hire; that is, if they earn their
living on the road, and if they use extraordinary machines on the roads.
If you are not using the highways for profit, you cannot be required to
have a driver's license.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION

NOW, comes the Accused, appearing specially and not generally or
voluntarily, but under threat of arrest if he failed to do so, with this
"BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION,"
stating as follows:

ARGUMENT

If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the public roads,
it was Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.
Justice Tolman stated:

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well
established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber
Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily
administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through
lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most
sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less
rapid encroachment."

Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash
133, 147.

The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in the ears of
Citizens throughout the country today as the use of the public roads has
been monopolized by the very entity which has been empowered to stand
guard over our freedoms, i.e., that of state government.

RIGHTS

The "most sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke
was personal liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:

"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and
liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been
protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions,
which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which
may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an
election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as
the Right to private property ... and is regarded as
inalienable."

16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987

This concept is further amplified by the definition of personal
liberty:

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of
locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained
as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all
other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public
highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage,
wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or
prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional
guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his
inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while
conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering
with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in
his person, but in his safe conduct."

II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329,
p.1135

and further ...

"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of
changing situations, of removing one's person to whatever place one's
inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due
process of law."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th ed.;
Blackstone's Commentary 134;

Hare, Constitution, Pg. 777

Justice Tolman was concerned about the State prohibiting the Citizen
from the "most sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement,
the Right of moving one's self from place to place without threat of
imprisonment, the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of
life.

When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control its
creation by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation
(charters). Corporations who use the roads in the course of business do
not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a difference
between a corporation and an individual. The United States Supreme Court
has stated:

"...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction
in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for
examination on the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his
Constitutional Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his
private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He
owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business,
or to open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to
incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives
nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life, liberty, and
property. His Rights are such as the law of the land long antecedent to
the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due
process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his
Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of
himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of
law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon
their rights."

"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the
state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public.
It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them
subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its
rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that the
State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises,
could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how those franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of corporate books and papers for that purpose."

Hale vs. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75

Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the
State's admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected
from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engaged in business
for profit.

"...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign
state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the
exercise of its police power (see police power, infra.), may absolutely
prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a
private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental
distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets
in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a
main instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a
common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the
legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is
plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the
streets by a common carrier in the prosecution of its business as such
is not a right but a mere license of privilege."

Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

It will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in order
to reach a lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right or "privilege."
We will attempt to reach a sound conclusion as to what is a "Right to use
the road" and what is a "privilege to use the road". Once reaching this
determination, we shall then apply those positions to modern case
decision.

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them."

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

and ...

"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be
converted into a crime."

Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489

and ...

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one
because of this exercise of constitutional Rights."

Snerer vs. Cullen, 481 F. 946

Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of
travel and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business
or pleasure.

"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and
transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental
Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully
deprived."

Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22?1;

Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934;
Boon vs. Clark, 214
SSW 607;
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163

and ...

"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways
and to transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or
by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city can prohibit or
permit at will, but a common Right which he has under the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579

So we can see that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the public
highways by automobile and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived of
his Liberty. So where does the misconception that the use of the public
road is always and only a privilege come from?

"... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the
public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does
not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a
place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested
right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license
which the legislature may grant or withhold at its
discretion."

State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073;
Cummins vs.
Homes, 155 P. 171;
Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256;

Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the
public highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business
upon the highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.

"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that
while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of
the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for
private gain."

Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;
Barney vs.
Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82

and ...

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to
transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and
business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the
highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a
stagecoach or omnibus."

State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864

What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically and
obviously" from one who uses the highway as a place of business? Who
better to enlighten us than Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of
Washington State? In State vs. City of Spokane, supra, the Court
also noted a very "radical and obvious" difference, but went on to explain
just what the difference is:

"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen,
a common right to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and
extraordinary."

and ...

"This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character,
is recognized by all the authorities."

State vs. City of Spokane, supra.

This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has
been proclaimed by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state
courts to the federal courts.

"the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to
transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and
business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the
highway his place of business and uses it for private gain in the
running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary
right of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter is
special, unusual, and extraordinary."

Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781

and ...

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways
and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life
and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy
life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue
happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the
ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes
of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon
thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary
purpose of life and business."

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.;
Teche Lines vs.
Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784

There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position. (See
Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, 329 and corresponding Am. Jur.
[2nd].)

"Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and
liberty -- is one of the fundamental or natural rights, which has been
protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions,
which is not derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution. ... It
is one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of
Justice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to private property ...
and is regarded as inalienable."

16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sect.202, Pg. 987

As we can see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public
roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads is drawn upon the line of
"using the road as a place of business" and the various state courts have
held so. But what have the U.S. Courts held on this point?

"First, it is well established law that the highways of the
state are public property, and their primary and preferred use is for
private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and
extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or
condition as it sees fit."

Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251;
Pachard
vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited;
Frost and F. Trucking
Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592;
Railroad commission
vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett
Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313

So what is a privilege to use the roads? By now it should be apparent
even to the "learned" that an attempt to use the road as a place of
business is a privilege. The distinction must be drawn between ...

Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public
roads, which is our Right; and ...

Using the public roads as a place of business or a main
instrumentality of business, which is a privilege.

"[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public
expense, and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may
acquire, a vested right to their use in carrying on a commercial
business."

Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294;
Barney vs.
Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82;
Stephenson vs. Binford,
supra.

"When the public highways are made the place of business the
state has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and
convenience of the public as well as the preservation of the
highways."

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.

"[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the
nature of the business and the use of the highways in connection
therewith."

Ibid.

"We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for
commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the
public, and in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or
regulate ... the use of the highways for gain."

Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works, supra.

There should be considerable authority on a subject as important a this
deprivation of the liberty of the individual "using the roads in the
ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be noted
that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority
acknowledging the state's power to convert the individual's right to
travel upon the public roads into a "privilege."

Therefore, it is concluded that the Citizen does have a
"Right" to travel and transport his property upon the public
highways and roads and the exercise of this Right is not a
"privilege."

DEFINITIONS

In order to understand the correct application of the statute in
question, we must first define the terms used in connection with this
point of law. As will be shown, many terms used today do not, in their
legal context, mean what we assume they mean, thus resulting in the
misapplication of statutes in the instant case.

AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE

There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle.
An automobile has been defined as:

"The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed
for the transportation of persons on highways."

American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60
A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200

While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts have
stated:

"A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle,
other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons
for which remuneration is received."

International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P.
120

The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the
word `automobile.'"

City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62
Ohio App. 232

The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:

"Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance
propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes
on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and
property.

"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage
of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other
considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any
business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes,
while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used upon the highways for
trade, commerce, or hire.

TRAVEL
The term "travel" is a significant term and is
defined as:

"The term `travel' and `traveler' are usually construed in
their broad and general sense ... so as to include all those who
rightfully use the highways viatically (when being reimbursed for
expenses) and who have occasion to pass over them for the purpose of
business, convenience, or pleasure."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717

"Traveler -- One who passes from place to place,
whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health."

Locket vs. State, 47 Ala. 45;
Bovier's Law
Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309

"Travel -- To journey or to pass through or over; as
a country district, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether
on foot, or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile,
carriage, ship, or aircraft; Make a journey."

Century Dictionary, Pg. 2034

Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to
one who uses a conveyance to go from one place to another, and included
all those who use the highways as a matter of Right.

Notice that in all these definitions, the phrase "for hire"
never occurs. This term "travel" or "traveler" implies,
by definition, one who uses the road as a means to move from one place to
another.

Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and
business for the purpose of travel and transportation is a traveler.

DRIVER

The term "driver" in contradistinction to "traveler,"
is defined as:

"Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach,
carriage, wagon, or other vehicle ..."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 940

Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed" in
conducting a vehicle. It should be self-evident that this individual could
not be "travelling" on a journey, but is using the road as a
place of business.

OPERATOR

Today we assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and
a "driver" is an "operator." However, this is not the
case.

"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that
a distinction is to be drawn between the terms `operator' and `driver';
the `operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to
have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for
hire; while the `driver' is the one who actually drives the car.
However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the
same person to be both "operator" and
"driver."

Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658

To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed
that this was a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business of
carrying passengers.

This definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road
as a place of business, or in other words, a person engaged in the
"privilege" of using the road for gain.

This definition, then, is a further clarification of the distinction
mentioned earlier, and therefore:

Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public
roads as a matter of Right meets the definition of a traveler.

Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets
the definition of a driver or an operator or both.

TRAFFIC

Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle," "traveler,"
"driver," and "operator," the next term to define is "traffic":

"... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive,
therefore, the prevention of unnecessary duplication of auto
transportation service will lengthen the life of the highways or reduce
the cost of maintenance, the revenue derived by the state ... will also
tend toward the public welfare by producing at the expense of those
operating for private gain, some small part of the cost of repairing the
wear ..."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co. vs. Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26

Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising
revenue by taxing the "privilege" to use the public roads "at
the expense of those operating for gain."

In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with
the unnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other words,
"vehicles for hire." The word "traffic" is another word
which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business.

"Traffic -- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of
merchandise, bills, money, or the like. The passing of goods and
commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or
money ..."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3307

Here again, notice that this definition refers to one "conducting
business." No mention is made of one who is traveling in his
automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in the passing of a
commodity or goods in exchange for money, i.e .., vehicles for hire.

Furthermore, the words "traffic" and "travel" must
have different meanings which the courts recognize. The difference is
recognized in Ex Parte Dickey, supra:

"...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses,
taxicabs, and hacks, when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the
ordinary traffic and travel and obstruct them."

The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a
distinction between the two. But, what was the distinction? We have
already defined both terms, but to clear up any doubt:

"The word `traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary
sense, and has reference to the business of transportation rather than
to its primary meaning of interchange of commodities."

Allen vs. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18

Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word
"traffic" (in either its primary or secondary sense) in reference
to business, and not to mere travel! So it is clear that the term
"traffic" is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege."
The net result being that "traffic" is brought under the (police) power of
the legislature. The term has no application to one who is not using the
roads as a place of business.

LICENSE

It seems only proper to define the word "license," as the
definition of this word will be extremely important in understanding the
statutes as they are properly applied:

"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which
without permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort."

People vs. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4

"Leave to do a thing which licensor could
prevent."

Western Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42
F.2d 116, 118

In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state
would have to take up the position that the exercise of a Constitutional
Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life and business
is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or
prevent.

This position, however, would raise magnitudinous Constitutional
questions as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental
Constitutional Law. (See "Conversion of a Right to a Crime,"
infra.)

In the instant case, the proper definition of a "license" is:

"a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body,
generally for consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to
pursue some occupation or to carry on some business which is subject to
regulation under the police power."

Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy,
158 P.2d 199, 203

This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of
carrying on business on the streets.

Most people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the
state for the purpose of raising revenue, yet there may well be more
subtle reasons contemplated; for when one seeks permission from someone to
do something he invokes the jurisdiction of the licensor which, in this
case, is the state. In essence, the licensee may well be seeking to be
regulated by the licensor.

"A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation,
with the fee to cover costs and expenses of supervision or
regulation."

State vs. Jackson, 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480,
487

The fee is the price; the regulation or control of the licensee is the
real aim of the legislation.

Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government, or are
they nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every
facet of our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted from
crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead now
busying themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all are properly
endorsed by the state?

How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for
our lawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for her
blender or mixer? They all have motors on them and the
state can always use the revenue.

POLICE POWER

The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually
arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain
act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be
paid for certain occupations. The power used in the instant case cannot,
however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a
Right would be open to Constitutional objection. (See "taxing
power," infra.)

Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions:

"Is there threatened danger?

Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

Is this regulation reasonable?"

People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715;

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power"

When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some
very important issues emerge.

First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using
his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and
business?

The answer is No! There is nothing inherently dangerous in the
use of an automobile when it is carefully managed. Their guidance, speed,
and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under a competent and
considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as a horse and buggy.

It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which
threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to
respond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the
least dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December,
1905.)

"The automobile is not inherently dangerous."

Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876;
Blair vs.
Broadmore, 93 SE 532

To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary
course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become
dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but
also the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)

Next; does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief,
and need not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this
Citizen does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by
automobile in the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore
be concluded that this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right.

The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this
regulation reasonable?"

The answer is No! It will be shown later in
"Regulation," infra., that this licensing statute is oppressive
and could be effectively administered by less oppressive means.

Although the Fourteenth
Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police
power, in accordance with the general principle that the power must be
exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution, it is established beyond question that every
state power, including the police power, is limited by the Fourteenth
Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitions there imposed.

Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power
regulations must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it
operates to limit the field of the police power to the extent of
preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the
Amendment protects. (See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)

"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is
elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be
overthrown or impaired by any state police authority."

Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540;

Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848;
O'Neil vs.
Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887

"The police power of the state must be exercised in
subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution."

Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60;
Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613

"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected
from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by
express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions."

Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the
police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the
letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the
clearest language."

Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882

As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth
Amendment is clear:

"No person shall be ... deprived of Life, Liberty, or
Property without due process of law."

As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established an
absolute Right to travel.

In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all
entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free and
natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due
process of law.

DUE PROCESS

"The essential elements of due process of law are ... Notice
and The Opportunity to defend."

Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427

Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of his/her
Right, let alone before signing the license (contract). Nor was the
Citizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/her right
to travel, by automobile, on the highways, in the ordinary course of life
and business. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of Liberty.

"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty
..."

Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31;
Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356

and ...

"The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a
citizen cannot deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna
Carta."

Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)

The focal point of this question of police power and due process must
balance upon the point of making the public highways a safe place for the
public to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates actual damage,
an action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The state could
then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of his Right to
use the public highways, for cause. This process would fulfill the due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at the same time
insuring that Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the state
constitutions would be protected.

But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there is no
cause for interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen.

One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due
process of law, is that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth
College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that by due process
is meant:

"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."

See also State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020;

Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333

Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law
that:

"no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has
had his day in court,"

by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been
afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and
opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is
judicial usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where it
is fairly administered. (12 Am.Jur. [1st] Const. Law, Sect. 573,
Pg. 269)

Note: This sounds like the process used to deprive one of the
"privilege" of operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be
kept in mind, however, that we are discussing the arbitrary deprivation of
the Right to use the road that all citizens have "in common."

The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in the
1959 Washington Attorney General's opinion on a similar issue:

"The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the
public highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is
recognized ..."

and ...

"Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways,
our legislature has required that motor vehicle operators be licensed
(I.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this requirement is
to insure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle operators will be
competent and qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard or risk
of harm, to which other users of the highways might otherwise be
subject. But once having complied with this regulatory provision, by
obtaining the required license, a motorist enjoys the privilege of
travelling freely upon the highways ..."

Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No. 88, Pg. 11

This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person using an
automobile as a matter of Right, must give up the Right and convert the
Right into a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise of
regulation. This statement is indicative of the insensitivity, even the
ignorance, of the government to the limits placed upon governments by and
through the several constitutions.

This legal theory may have been able to stand in 1959; however, as of
1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda, even this
weak defense of the state's actions must fall.

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them."

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizen's
Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing legislation forcing the
citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right into a privilege.
Furthermore, we have previously established that this "privilege"
has been defined as applying only to those who are "conducting
business in the streets" or "operating for-hire vehicles."

The legislature has attempted (by legislative fiat) to deprive the
Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life and
business, without affording the Citizen the safeguard of due process
of law. This has been accomplished under supposed powers of
regulation.

REGULATION

"In addition to the requirement that regulations governing
the use of the highways must not be violative of constitutional
guarantees, the prime essentials of such regulation are reasonableness,
impartiality, and definiteness or certainty."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 260

and ...

"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the
regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right
and one carried on by government sufferance of permission."

Davis vs. Massachusetts, 167 US 43;
Pachard
vs. Banton, supra.

One can say for certain that these regulations are impartial since they
are being applied to all, even though they are clearly beyond the limits
of the legislative powers. However, we must consider whether such
regulations are reasonable and non-violative of constitutional guarantees.

First, let us consider the reasonableness of this statute requiring all
persons to be licensed (presuming that we are applying this statute to all
persons using the public roads). In determining the reasonableness of the
statute we need only ask two questions:

Does the statute accomplish its stated goal?

The answer is No!

The attempted explanation for this regulation "to insure the
safety of the public by insuring, as much as possible, that all are
competent and qualified."

However, one can keep his license without retesting, from the time
he/she is first licensed until the day he/she dies, without regard to
the competency of the person, by merely renewing said license before it
expires. It is therefore possible to completely skirt the goal of this
attempted regulation, thus proving that this regulation does not
accomplish its goal.

Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives the appearance
of underwriting the competence of the licensees, and could therefore be
held liable for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees.

Is the statute reasonable?

The answer is No!

This statute cannot be determined to be reasonable since it requires
to the Citizen to give up his or her natural Right to travel
unrestricted in order to accept the privilege. The purported goal of
this statute could be met by much less oppressive regulations, i.e.,
competency tests and certificates of competency before using an
automobile upon the public roads. (This is exactly the situation in the
aviation sector.)

But isn't this what we have now?

The answer is No! The real purpose of this license is much more
insidious. When one signs the license, he/she gives up his/her
Constitutional Right to travel in order to accept and exercise a
privilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract, the Citizen has to
give the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for constructive crimes
and quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done and no damaged
property.

These prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of their
Constitutional Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by jury
of twelve persons and the Right to counsel, as well as the normal
safeguards such as proof of intent and a corpus dilecti and a grand jury
indictment. These unconstitutional prosecutions take place because the
Citizen is exercising a privilege and has given his/her "implied
consent" to legislative enactments designed to control interstate
commerce, a regulatable enterprise under the police power of the state.

We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give up
Constitutional guarantees of "Right" in order to exercise his state
"privilege" to travel upon the public highways in the ordinary course of
life and business.

SURRENDER OF RIGHTS

A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name of
regulation.

"... the only limitations found restricting the right of the
state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of
vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must
not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain
that they surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as
a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use
..."

Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619;
Stephenson vs.
Binford, supra.

If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender
Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of
law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right?

Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15

and ...

"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another."

Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389

Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise
the privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police
power, due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute which
is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen of
Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the state
constitutions.

TAXING POWER

"Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would be
immediately open to severe Constitutional objections. If it could be
said that the state had the power to tax a Right, this would enable the
state to destroy Rights guaranteed by the constitution through the use
of oppressive taxation. The question herein, is one of the state taxing
the Right to travel by the ordinary modes of the day, and whether this
is a legislative object of the state taxation.

The views advanced herein are neither novel nor unsupported by
authority. The question of taxing power of the states has been
repeatedly considered by the Supreme Court. The Right of the state to
impede or embarrass the Constitutional operation of the U.S. Government
or the Rights which the Citizen holds under it, has been uniformly
denied."

McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316

The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given the
power to destroy Rights through taxation, the framers of the Constitution
wrote that document in vain.

"... It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing
through the state cannot sensibly affect any function of government or
deprive a Citizen of any valuable Right. But if a state can tax ... a
passenger of one dollar, it can tax him a thousand dollars."

Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall 35, 46

and ...

"If the Right of passing through a state by a Citizen of the
United States is one guaranteed by the Constitution, it must be sacred
from state taxation."

Ibid., Pg. 47

Therefore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms of
state taxation and if this argument is used by the state as a defense of
the enforcement of this statute, then this argument also must fail.

CONVERSION OF A RIGHT TO A CRIME

As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel and to
transport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary course of
life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel (without
first giving up the Right and converting that Right into a privilege) the
Citizen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts to converting the
exercise of a Constitutional Right into a crime.

Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs. Cullen quotes
from Pg. 5, and:

"The state cannot diminish Rights of the people."

Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516

and ...

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved,
there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them."

Miranda, supra.

Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the limitations
of the constitution was to protect the rights of the people from
intrusion, particularly by the forces of government.

So we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of
using the public highways as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon
its face.

Any person who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so
exercises that Right, cannot be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet,
this Freeman stands before this court today to answer charges for the
"crime" of exercising his Right to Liberty. As we have already
shown, the term "drive" can only apply to those who are employed
in the business of transportation for hire. It has been shown that freedom
includes the Citizen's Right to use the public highways in the ordinary
course of life and business without license or regulation by the police
powers of the state.

CONCLUSION

It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and
not the mere form.

"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be
misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a
solemn duty -- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of
its authority. If, therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted
to protect ... the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to
those objects or is a palpable invasion of Rights secured by the
fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby
give effect to the Constitution."

Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661

and ...

"It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
Constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon."

Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616

The courts are duty bound to recognize and stop the
stealthy encroachments which have been made upon the Citizen's
Right to travel and to use the roads to transport his property in the
"ordinary course of life and business." (Hadfield, supra.)

Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part of
the Liberty of which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause
and without the due process of law guaranteed in the Fifth
Amendment. (Kent, supra.)

The history of this invasion of the Citizen's Right to use the
public highways shows clearly that the legislature simply found a
heretofore untapped source of revenue, got greedy, and attempted to
enforce a statute in an unconstitutional manner upon those free and
natural individuals who have a Right to travel upon the highways. This was
not attempted in an outright action, but in a slow, meticulous, calculated
encroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel.

This position must be accepted unless the prosecutor can show his
authority for the position that the "use of the road in the ordinary
course of life and business" is a privilege.

To rule in any other manner, without clear authority for an adverse
ruling, will infringe upon fundamental and basic concepts of
Constitutional law. This position, that a Right cannot be regulated under
any guise, must be accepted without concern for the monetary loss of the
state.

"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot
be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily,
promote in some respects the best interests of the public."

Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660

and ...

"Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of
Constitutional guarantee."

Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018;
16 Am.Jur.
(2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 81

and ...

"Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of
hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded
Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it
is less expensive to deny them than to afford them."

Watson vs. Memphis, 375 US 526

Therefore, the Court's decision in the instant case must be made
without the issue of cost to the state being taken into consideration, as
that issue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose money that it never had a
right to demand from the Sovereign People.

Finally, we come to the issue of public policy. It could be
argued that the licensing scheme of all persons is a matter of
public policy. However, if this argument is used, it too must fail, as:

"No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the
positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution."

16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 70

So even public policy cannot abrogate this Citizen's Right to travel
and to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and
business. Therefore, it must be concluded that:

"We have repeatedly held that the legislature may regulate
the use of the highways for carrying on business for private gain and
that such regulation is a valid exercise of the police
power."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co., supra.

and ...

"The act in question is a valid regulation, and as such is
binding upon all who use the highway for the purpose of private
gain."

Ibid.

Any other construction of this statute would render it unconstitutional
as applied to this Citizen or any Citizen. The Accused therefore moves
this court to dismiss the charge against him, with prejudice.

June 10, 1986.
This ends the legal brief.

In addition:

Since no notice is given to people applying for driver's (or other)
licenses that they have a perfect right to use the roads without any
permission, and that they surrender valuable rights by taking on the
regulation system of licensure, the state has committed a massive
construction fraud. This occurs when any person is told that they must
have a license in order to use the public roads and highways.

The license, being a legal contract under which the state is empowered
with policing powers, is only valid when the licensee takes on the burdens
of the contract and bargains away his or her rights knowingly,
intentionally, and voluntarily.

Few know that the driver's license is a contract without which the
police are powerless to regulate the people's actions or activities.

Few (if any) licensees intentionally surrender valuable rights. They
are told that they must have the license. As we have seen, this is not the
case.

No one in their right mind voluntarily surrenders complete liberty and
accepts in its place a set of regulations.

"The people never give up their liberties but under some
delusion."

Edmund Burke, (1784)

This article was submitted to us by a reader. If anyone knows the name
of the author, we will gladly give credit.

(Isaiah 33:22) For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our
lawgiver, the Lord is our king; he will save us.

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